\u3cem\u3eRepublican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee:\u3c/em\u3e Reinterpreting the Court’s Role in Election Law Challenges by Brody, Carly L.
Maryland Law Review 
Volume 80 Issue 4 Article 6 
Republican National Committee v. Democratic National 
Committee: Reinterpreting the Court’s Role in Election Law 
Challenges 
Carly L. Brody 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Carly L. Brody, Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee: Reinterpreting the 
Court’s Role in Election Law Challenges, 80 Md. L. Rev. 1191 (2021) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol80/iss4/6 
This Notes & Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at 
DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized 






REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE V. DEMOCRATIC 
NATIONAL COMMITTEE: REINTERPRETING THE COURT’S 
ROLE IN ELECTION LAW CHALLENGES 
CARLY L. BRODY* 
 
In Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee,1 
the Supreme Court of the United States addressed whether the date prescribed 
by Wisconsin law to receive absentee ballots in the State’s April 2020 
primary election could be extended in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic 
(“COVID-19”).2  Many voters who timely requested their ballots did not 
receive their ballots in time to return them before the statutory deadline.3  
COVID-19 created an unprecedented late surge in absentee ballot requests 
that overwhelmed election officials and resulted in a backlog of sending 
ballots to voters.4  The lower federal courts granted a six-day extension for 
receiving absentee ballots, considering when the ballots would be “received 
by” as the only relevant inquiry.5  On appeal, the Supreme Court focused on 
when the ballots would be “received by” and “postmarked by,” and 
weakened the lower courts’ remedy by requiring that ballots received up to 
six days after the election also be postmarked by election day.6   
The Court decided the case by narrowly focusing on the notion that 
lower federal courts should not change election rules close to an election, 
while failing to properly weigh other election-specific considerations.7  The 
Court’s reasoning in Republican National Committee laid the groundwork 
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 1. 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (per curiam) [hereinafter Republican Nat’l Comm.]. 
 2. Id. at 1206.  
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 21–22; see also infra notes 217–221 and accompanying 
text.  
 4. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1210 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 35–38. 
 6. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1206.  
 7. See infra Section IV.A. 
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for more emergency judicial decisions by lower courts as the 2020 General 
Election approached, which relied on the same reasoning and unfortunately 
precipitated further confusion and disenfranchisement in the midst of a public 
health emergency.8  In light of these repercussions, this Note argues that (1) 
the Court should not have intervened in the Wisconsin dispute, and that by 
doing so, the Court threatened its legitimacy;9 (2) the Court improperly 
considered the timing of the election by relying on the Purcell principle as a 
rigid rule10 and by applying it in a way that contradicted the principle’s 
purpose;11 (3) the Court emphasized the timing of the election while 
neglecting to fully account for the election law’s burden on voters;12 and (4) 
the dissent’s reasoning insufficiently assessed the constitutional analyses 
required in deciding election-related challenges.13 
I. THE CASE 
Wisconsin planned to hold its spring election in person on Tuesday, 
April 7, 2020, but this plan was complicated by the emerging COVID-19 
pandemic.14  The ballots included the presidential primaries; a Wisconsin 
Supreme Court seat; three Wisconsin Court of Appeals seats; over 100 other 
judgeships; over 500 school board seats; and thousands of other local 
positions.15  In the weeks leading up to the election, Wisconsin reported more 
than 1,0000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and approximately twenty-four 
deaths attributable to the disease,16 but experts estimated that the actual 
number of Wisconsin citizens infected was ten times higher and projected 
that cases would continue rising.17  The surge in cases prompted Wisconsin’s 
governor to issue a shelter-in-place order on March 24, 2020, to slow the 
virus’s spread.18  ID.  Meanwhile, options for voting in-person before or on 
election day became severely limited as a number of polling places closed 
when poll workers and municipal clerks canceled their shifts and the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission (“WEC”) expressed public health concerns 
about those sites that remained open.19  FN. Because voting in person during 
 
 8. See infra Section IV.B. 
 9. See infra Section IV.A. 
 10. See infra Section IV.B.1. 
 11. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
 12. See infra Section IV.C. 
 13. See infra Section IV.D. 
 14. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1206, 1208 (2020) (per curiam). 
 15. Id. at 1209 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 16. Id. at 1208 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 17. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 960–61 (W.D. Wis. 2020).  
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 961, 965. 
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the pandemic is a public health risk and state public officials encouraged 
voters to vote absentee, Wisconsin’s absentee ballot requests rose to 
unprecedented levels.20  For the April 2020 primary election, at least 
1,119,439 voters requested absentee ballots—nearly one million more than 
in 2016, which had the most requests of the four previous spring elections.21  
Processing these demands overwhelmed election officials and resulted in 
backlogs that threatened thousands of ballots from arriving in time to be 
counted.22  COVID-19 also resulted in United States Postal Service (“USPS”) 
slow-downs and, combined, these delays made the deadline for receiving 
absentee ballots at 8:00 P.M. on election day “completely unworkable.”23 
In the two weeks leading up to the election, Plaintiffs—including 
individual Wisconsin voters, community organizations, the Democratic 
National Committee, and the Democratic Party of Wisconsin—filed three 
suits against the WEC in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Wisconsin.24  The suits challenged multiple statutory requirements 
for the April 7, 2020, election.25  Relevant to the Supreme Court’s opinion 
and this Note is Wisconsin’s statutory deadline for receiving absentee ballots, 
which was 8:00 P.M. on election day.26  On March 28, the district court 
consolidated the three cases.27  Additionally, the district court granted the 
Republican National Committee’s and the Republican Party of Wisconsin’s 
motion to intervene on behalf of the WEC.28   
On March 27, 2020, Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction from the 
district court to extend the deadline for clerks to receive absentee ballots 
mailed in by voters.29  The district court held an evidentiary hearing and oral 
argument on April 1, 2020.30  The following day, the court granted the 
Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the statutory 
 
 20. Id. at 957–58, 960; Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1208–09 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 21. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1209 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Bostelmann, 451 F. 
Supp. 3d at 961. 
 22. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 961–62.  
 23. Id. at 962.  
 24. Id. at 957; Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1209 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 25. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 957.   
 26. Id. at 958–59. 
 27. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1209 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 28. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, No. 20-cv-249-wmc, at *12 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 28, 
2020). 
 29. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 958.  Plaintiffs also sought an extension of the deadline for 
absentee ballots; suspension of the witness signature requirement on absentee ballots; and 
reconsideration of the court’s ruling on the by-mail absentee deadline and documentation 
requirements.  Id.  However, the issue on appeal in the Supreme Court involved the extension of the 
deadline to receive absentee ballots.  Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1206. 
 30. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 958. 
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voting deadlines “impose an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote.”31  
In assessing whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the court conducted a 
two-step inquiry.32  The court first evaluated whether the Plaintiffs met a 
preliminary threshold by demonstrating: “(1) that [they] will suffer 
irreparable harm absent preliminary injunctive relief during the pendency of 
[their] action; (2) inadequate remedies at law exist; and (3) [they have] a 
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.”33  After determining that the 
Plaintiffs had satisfied this threshold, the court conducted a balancing 
analysis “to determine whether the balance of harm favors the moving party 
or whether the harm to other parties or the public sufficiently outweighs the 
movant’s interests.”34 
The district court granted an injunction to extend the statutory deadline 
to receive absentee ballots from 8:00 P.M. on election day, April 7, 2020, to 
4:00 P.M. on April 13, 2020.35  However, the court did “not add a post-
marked-by date requirement” and relied on WEC’s statement that it did not 
oppose extending the deadline.36  The court reasoned that “even the most 
diligent voter may be unable to return his or her ballot in time to be 
counted.”37   
In an emergency appeal on April 3, 2020, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s six-day extension 
for receiving absentee ballots.38  The Supreme Court of the United States 
granted the application for stay on April 6, 2020 to decide “whether absentee 
ballots now must be mailed and postmarked by election day, Tuesday, April 
7, as state law would necessarily require, or instead may be mailed and 
postmarked after election day, so long as they are received by Monday, April 
13.”39  
II. THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Republican National Committee, the issue before the Supreme Court 
was whether to stay the lower courts’ grant of preliminary injunction.40  The 
 
 31. Id. at 959, 969. 
 32. Id. at 968.  
 33. Id. (quoting Whitaker By Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 
F.3d 1034, 1044 (7th Cir. 2017)). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 959. 
 36. Id. at 976–77. 
 37. Id. at 976. 
 38. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, No. 20–1538, 2020 WL 3619499, at *8 (7th Cir. 
Apr. 3, 2020). 
 39. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1206 (2020) (per curiam). 
 40. Id. 
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preliminary injunction permitted absentee ballots to be mailed in and 
received for up to six days after the 2020 Wisconsin primary election in the 
midst of the COVID-19 pandemic.41  In a per curium opinion, the Court ruled 
that the district court erred by (1) granting relief that the Plaintiffs did not 
request in their preliminary injunction motions, and (2) altering election laws 
only five days before the election.42  The Court reasoned that precedent 
prohibited lower federal courts from changing “the election rules on the eve 
of an election.”43  The Court categorized the district court’s eleventh-hour 
order as “judicially created confusion” and observed that Purcell v. 
Gonzalez,44 which cautioned against issuing conflicting court orders close to 
an election,45 demanded it be rebuked.46   
The Court emphasized that the Plaintiffs themselves did not ask for the 
six-day grace period in their preliminary injunction motions.47  Then, the 
Court justified its intervention by explaining that it has a responsibility to 
correct a lower court’s error in changing the election rules so close to the 
election.48  The Court also equated the timing to that of absentee voters who 
requested their ballots late in previous Wisconsin elections.49  Finally, the 
Court claimed the dissent disregarded that the State already extended the 
receipt deadline for absentee ballots from April 7 to April 13 “to 
accommodate Wisconsin voters.”50  The Court maintained that the Plaintiffs 
actually requested an extension to expand the opportunity to vote absentee, 
not an extension by which ballots may be cast and counted.51  In granting a 
partial stay pending final disposition of the appeal by the Seventh Circuit, the 
Court concluded that absentee ballots could only be counted if they were (1) 
postmarked by election day, April 7, 2020, and received by April 13, 2020, 
at 4:00 P.M.; or (2) hand-delivered by April 7, 2020, at 8:00 P.M.52   
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg rejected the Court’s characterization that the 
case merely presented “a narrow, technical question”; she instead argued that 
the issue was “whether tens of thousands of Wisconsin citizens [could] vote 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 1206–07. 
 43. Id. at 1207 (citing Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam)).  
 44. 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam).  
 45. Id. at 4–5. 
 46. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1207. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. (reasoning that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence “that these voters here would be 
in a substantially different position from late-requesting voters in other Wisconsin elections with 
respect to the timing of their receipt of absentee ballots”). 
 50. Id. at 1207–08. 
 51. Id. at 1208. 
 52. Id. 
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safely in the midst of a pandemic.”53  Justice Ginsburg contended that the 
district court’s order allowed Wisconsin citizens to do so and expressed her 
fear that the Court’s outcome would result in “massive 
disenfranchisement.”54  She reasoned that many voters who timely requested 
their ballots would not receive them prior to the postmarked-by deadline.55   
In rejoinder to the majority’s concerns, Justice Ginsburg first explained 
that although the Plaintiffs did not request that ballots postmarked after April 
7, 2020 be counted in their preliminary injunction motions, they requested 
that relief at the preliminary injunction hearing.56  Next, she argued that the 
majority’s hesitation regarding the timing of the district court’s response so 
close to the election made its decision, which was “even closer to the 
election,” even “more inappropriate.”57  In response to the Court’s concern 
that the district court’s order permitted voters to vote after election day, 
Justice Ginsburg maintained that the district court’s decision to enjoin 
publication of the election results before April 13, 2020, safeguarded an 
accurate depiction of the results.58  She reasoned that these concerns “pale in 
comparison to the risk that tens of thousands of voters will be 
disenfranchised” and advocated for “[e]nsuring an opportunity for the people 
of Wisconsin to exercise their votes.”59  
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The United States Constitution does not grant an affirmative right to 
vote in national and state elections, but courts have long recognized an 
implicit fundamental political right to vote.60  The Constitution prohibits 
states from denying the right to vote on the bases of race,61 sex,62 age,63 and 
 
 53. Id. at 1211 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 54. Id. at 1209, 1211.  
 55. Id. at 1209. 
 56. Id. at 1210. 
 57. Id. at 1210–11. 
 58. Id. at 1211. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“[T]he political franchise of voting . . . is regarded as a fundamental political 
right, because [it is] preservative of all rights.”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554–55 (1964) 
(“It has been repeatedly recognized that all qualified voters have a constitutionally protected right 
to vote . . . and to have their votes counted . . . . [because] [t]he right to vote freely for the candidate 
of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society.”); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 
663, 665 (1966) (“[T]he right to vote in state elections is implicit . . . .”). 
 61. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.  
 63. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. 
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failure to pay a poll tax.64  However, the Constitution grants states the 
authority to create election codes for primary and general elections—
including elections at the federal level—and reserves powers for states to 
oversee elections of the state legislature.65  Constitutional challenges to state 
election codes often invoke the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and courts 
evaluate the challenged law’s burdens on voters in determining the 
appropriate level of scrutiny to apply.66  Section A describes state voting 
laws.67  Section B discusses constitutional challenges to state election laws.68  
Section C examines the Purcell principle, which courts frequently reference 
in emergency decisions.69  Section D explores the framework of the 
Anderson-Burdick balancing test, which courts frequently apply when 
assessing the likelihood of success on the merits in preliminary injunction 
analyses of constitutional challenges to election laws.70   
A. State Voting Laws 
The Constitution confers broad power on the states to establish rules 
regulating federal elections, and states also have a reserved power to create 
laws for their state legislature elections.71  To ensure order in the election 
process, states have created election codes for holding elections at the state 
and federal levels.72  In addition to prescribing the time, place, and manner 
of holding primary and general elections, states also specify the qualifications 
for voters and procedures for voter registration.73  They also establish the 
qualifications and selection criteria for candidates.74   
 
 64. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1. 
 65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.  
 66. See infra Section III.B.  
 67. See infra Section III.A. 
 68. See infra Section III.B. 
 69. See infra Section III.C. 
 70. See infra Section III.D.  The “Anderson-Burdick balancing test” was established by two 
cases, Anderson v. Celebrezze, 469 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 
(1992).  
 71. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof . . . .”).  
 72. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (“[A]s a practical matter, there must be a 
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather 
than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.”); Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130 
(7th Cir. 2004) (“The Constitution . . . . confers on the states broad authority to regulate the conduct 
of elections, including federal ones.”). 
 73. See Storer, 415 U.S. at 730 (explaining that states have developed “comprehensive, and in 
many respects complex, election codes” for state and federal elections).   
 74. Id.   
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Unlike the federal constitution, most state constitutions grant an 
affirmative right to vote.75  State constitutions also authorize their legislatures 
to regulate absentee voting procedures.76  State absentee voting laws 
prescribe varying levels of voter protections, such as universal vote-by-mail 
whereby voters automatically receive a ballot;77 providing all registered 
voters an application for absentee voting; and not requiring an excuse for 
applying to vote absentee.78  
B. Constitutional Challenges to State Election Codes 
While the United States Constitution leaves states broad authority to 
create election codes, states may not impose burdens on the right to vote that 
conflict with other constitutional provisions.79  But any restrictions that states 
impose on voting will always exclude someone.80  Thus, courts consider 
“whether the restriction and resulting exclusion are reasonable given the 
interest the restriction serves.”81  Challenges to state voting laws frequently 
invoke the First Amendment rights of expression and association and the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses.82  
To determine which level of scrutiny to apply and which constitutional 
test to use, courts first assess the burden that a state law has on a political 
party, a voter, or a class of voters.83  No litmus test exists for measuring the 
severity of the burden, but a state must prove its interest outweighs the 
 
 75. See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“[E]very citizen of the United States, of the age of 18 years 
or upwards, who is a resident of the State as of the time for the closing of registration next preceding 
the election, shall be entitled to vote in the ward or election district in which the citizen resides at 
all elections to be held in this State.”); WIS. CONST. art. III (“Every United States citizen age 18 or 
older who is a resident of an election district in this state is a qualified elector of that district.”).  But 
see generally ARIZ. CONST. art. VII (omitting a constitutional right to vote).  
 76. See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. I, § 3a (“The General Assembly shall have the power to provide 
by suitable enactment for voting by qualified voters of the State of Maryland who are absent at the 
time of any election in which they are entitled to vote, for voting by other qualified voters who are 
unable to vote personally, or for voting by qualified voters who might otherwise choose to vote by 
absentee ballot, and for the manner in which and the time and place at which such absent voters 
may vote, and for the canvass and return of their votes.”); WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“Laws may be 
enacted . . . [p]roviding for absentee voting.”). 
 77. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 254.470(3) (2020).  
 78. See, e.g., 2018 Md. H.B. 829 (2018). 
 79. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 34 (1968); Doe v. Walker, 746 F. Supp. 2d 667, 
669 (D. Md. 2010) (internal citations omitted) (“It is axiomatic that a state may not erect obstacles 
which deprive a group of citizens of the fundamental right to vote absent sufficient justification.”).  
 80. Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[S]tate legislatures may without 
transgressing the Constitution impose extensive restrictions on voting.  Any such restriction is going 
to exclude, either de jure or de facto, some people from voting . . . .”).  
 81. Id. 
 82. See e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992).  
 83. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008). 
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restriction on voting rights.84  Where a law severely burdens the right to vote, 
courts apply a standard of strict scrutiny.85  For lesser burdens, courts use a 
more deferential standard: the Anderson-Burdick balancing test.86  
Meanwhile, in time-sensitive matters where courts assess injunctions and do 
not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, courts frequently invoke 
the Purcell principle.87   
C. The Purcell Principle 
In Purcell v. Gonzalez,88 the Supreme Court acknowledged the 
importance of timing when a lower court issues an order concerning an 
election.89  In that case, the State of Arizona—and officials from four of its 
counties—sought relief from an interlocutory injunction issued by a Ninth 
Circuit motions panel.90  The Ninth Circuit had issued an injunction of an 
Arizona statute that required voters to present proof of citizenship when they 
registered to vote and to provide identification when they voted in person.91  
Voters who did not have the requisite identification could still vote in person 
using a provisional ballot.92   
The Court noted that the federal appellate court was asked to enjoin the 
implementation of the voter identification procedures “just weeks before an 
election,” and determined that it should have balanced the potential harms of 
issuing or not issuing an injunction with “considerations specific to election 
cases and its own institutional procedures.”93  The Court explained that court 
 
 84. Id. at 190–91.  But see id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (defining the criteria 
for determining the severity of burdens as follows: Those that are “[o]rdinary and widespread 
burdens, such as those requiring ‘nominal effort’ of everyone, are not severe,” whereas those that 
“go beyond the merely inconvenient” are severe). 
 85. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964) (establishing that “any alleged 
infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized”); see 
also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 756 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted) (explaining where legislation burdens the right to vote, a state must show “that 
the burden imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest”). 
 86. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing how courts apply the 
approach set out in Burdick to state statutes governing voter qualifications, candidate selection, and 
the voting process); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 970, n.13 (W.D. 
Wis. 2020) (explaining that the Anderson-Burdick balancing framework evaluates “the 
constitutional rules that apply to state election regulations” (quoting Harlan v. Scholz, 866 F.3d 754, 
759 (7th Cir. 2017)); infra Section III.D. 
 87. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 3–5 (2006) (per curiam); see also infra Section III.C. 
 88. 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam).  
 89. Id. at 3–5.  
 90. Id. at 2.  
 91. Id. at 2–3. 
 92. Id. at 2. 
 93. Id. at 4. 
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orders close to an election increase the risks of voter confusion and voter 
deterrence, although those issues alone do not control.94  The Court held that 
the appellate court erred by failing to provide an explanation for its own 
findings and by not giving deference to the district court’s conclusions.95  
Ultimately, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s injunction and allowed the 
election to proceed with those requirements in effect because the imminence 
of the election did not provide enough time to resolve factual disputes.96   
In multiple challenges to voter identification laws decided on 
emergency motions where the Court has not issued a majority opinion, the 
Court’s dissenters have applied Purcell to stand for the notion that decisions 
too close to an election threaten voter confusion and disenfranchisement.97  
For example, in Veasey v. Perry,98 the Court did not provide an opinion for 
its decision to vacate a stay of a federal district court’s injunction of a Texas 
voter identification law, which the district court found imposed an 
unconstitutional burden on voters and violated the Voting Rights Act.99  In 
dissent, Justice Ginsburg invoked Purcell to argue that since the district court 
made an expedited schedule in November 2013 for resolving the case, “Texas 
knew full well that the court would issue its ruling only weeks away from the 
election.”100  Thus, the State had time to prepare for the possibility of an order 
preventing enforcement of the voter identification law.101  In Frank v. 
Walker,102 the Court vacated a stay of a permanent injunction that invalidated 
a Wisconsin voting law that required voters to provide photo identification 
before they could cast a vote.103  In dissent, Justice Alito noted the “proximity 
of the upcoming general election” as support for the Court’s decision, before 
rejecting the Court’s decision on other grounds.104  Later, dissenting in 
Brakebill v. Jaeger,105 Justice Ginsburg argued that the Purcell principle 
supported granting a preliminary injunction because the challenged North 
 
 94. Id. at 5.  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 5–6. 
 97. See Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9, 10 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Frank v. Walker, 
574 U.S. 929, 929 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting); Brakebill v. Jaeger, 139 S. Ct. 10, 10–11 (2018) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
 98. 135 U.S. 9 (2014). 
 99. See Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 633 (S.D. Tex. 2014), stayed, 769 F.3d 890, 892 
(5th Cir. 2014), denying motion to vacate stay, 135 U.S. 9 (2014).  
 100. Veasey, 135 S. Ct. at 10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 101. Id. 
 102. 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014). 
 103. See Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 837, 842 (E.D. Wis. 2014), stayed, 766 F.3d 755, 
756 (7th Cir. 2014), vacating stay, 135 S. Ct. 7, 7 (2014).  
 104. Frank, 134 S. Ct. at 7–8 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 105. 139 S. Ct. 10 (2018). 
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Dakota voter identification law created a severe risk of voter confusion and 
disenfranchisement.106  She focused on the risk of voter confusion over the 
proximity of the election, likely because the law was issued more than a year 
before the election.107 
D. The Anderson-Burdick Balancing Test 
In Anderson v. Celebrezze,108 the Supreme Court considered whether 
Ohio’s early filing deadline for a candidate to qualify for a position on the 
state ballot placed an unconstitutional burden on a candidate’s supporters’ 
voting and associational rights.109  The Court determined that constitutional 
challenges to state election laws cannot be resolved by any litmus test that 
separately considers valid and invalid restrictions.110  Although state election 
codes burden, to some degree, the individual’s right to vote or the right to 
associate with others for political ends, the Court reasoned that states’ 
regulatory interests frequently substantiate “reasonable, nondiscriminatory 
restrictions.”111  Therefore, the Court prescribed an analytical process to 
assess whether a state’s challenged provision of its election law places an 
unconstitutional burden on voters’ First Amendment rights.112  Under this 
framework, courts first weigh the asserted injury according to the rights 
protected by the First Amendment and, second, consider the state’s interests 
that support the burden imposed.113  After weighing these factors, courts 
determine the constitutionality of the challenged provision.114  
Nine years later, the Court applied the Anderson balancing test in 
Burdick v. Takushi115 to uphold a Hawaii election law requiring a political 
candidate to participate in a primary election prior to obtaining a position on 
the general election ballot.116  In a challenge alleging violations of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court recognized that state election law 
provisions imposing “‘severe’ restrictions” on voters’ rights must be 
 
 106. See Brakebill v. Jaeger, No. 1:16-cv-008, 2016 WL 7118548 (D.N.D. Aug. 1, 2016), 
terminating injunction, 2018 WL 1612190, at *8 (D.N.D. Apr. 3, 2018), denying stay pending 
appeal, 2018 WL 4714914, at *3 (D.N.D. Apr. 30, 2018), granting stay, 905 F.3d 553, 554 (8th Cir. 
2018), denying motion to vacate stay, 139 S. Ct. 10, 10 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 107. Brakebill, 139 S. Ct. 10, 10 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Brakebill, 905 F.3d 553, 556 
(8th Cir. 2018). 
 108. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
 109. Id. at 782. 
 110. Id. at 789.  
 111. Id. at 788. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 789. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 116. Id. at 430. 
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“narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.”117  
Accordingly, the Court noted the necessity of applying a strict scrutiny 
standard.118  Meanwhile, the Court explained that where an election law 
creates a lesser burden, a state does not need to establish a compelling 
interest; “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” invoke only a rational 
basis inquiry.119  In reaffirming Anderson’s requirement to weigh the asserted 
injury to the right to vote against the State’s justifications for the burden 
imposed by its statute, “Burdick forged Anderson’s amorphous ‘flexible 
standard’ into something resembling an administrable rule.”120  Although 
both Anderson and Burdick involved ballot-access cases, the Supreme Court 
has applied the balancing standard in other types of challenges to state voting 
laws.121  Where courts evaluate whether to grant preliminary injunctions of 
state election laws facing constitutional challenges, they apply the Anderson-
Burdick test to assess the likelihood of success on the merits.122  
IV. ANALYSIS 
In Republican National Committee, the Supreme Court stayed a grant 
of a preliminary injunction that would have allowed ballots mailed and 
postmarked after election day—but received within six days of the 2020 
Wisconsin primary election—to be counted.123  The dispute over when 
ballots needed to be received or postmarked emerged because of the 
challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic.124  Because the Court 
 
 117. Id. at 434 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). 
 118. See id.; Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 429 (6th Cir. 2009).   
 119. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433–34 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)); 
Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 429. 
 120. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204–05 (2008) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (citing Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434). 
 121. See Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 425, 429, 431 (upholding a district court’s application of 
the Anderson-Burdick balancing test in a request for a preliminary injunction against an Ohio 
election law that ended in-person early voting for non-military voters three days before the election 
because it imposed an excessive burden on Plaintiffs by precluding a significant number of voters 
from casting their ballots, of which their constituents constituted a large proportion); Crawford, 553 
U.S. at 204 (describing the Supreme Court’s expansive application of the Anderson-Burdick 
balancing test “[t]o evaluate a law respecting the right to vote—whether it governs voter 
qualifications, candidate selection, or the voting process”).  
 122. “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on 
the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 
balance of the equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”  Winter v. 
Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see also Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 429 
(applying the Anderson-Burdick “flexible standard” where “a plaintiff alleges that a state has 
burdened voting rights through the disparate treatment of voters” (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 
U.S. at 434)).  
 123. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1206 (2020) (per curiam). 
 124. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 957 (W.D. Wis. 2020). 
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decided this case only one day before the election, the Court’s opinion 
effectively served as a final judgment without a proper assessment of the 
success on the merits or the harms to the parties and the public.125  The 
Court’s decision narrowed the scope of assessing absentee voting challenges 
from one that involved a balancing of voters’ and states’ respective burdens 
to one dependent upon the proximity of the election.126  For future challenges 
to states’ absentee voting laws, this decision has the unfortunate effect of 
marking a new era of reliance upon the Purcell principle that has perpetuated 
voter disenfranchisement, while simultaneously reframing the Court’s role in 
the judicial process and creating skepticism that partisanship influenced its 
decision-making.127   
Section IV.A criticizes the Court’s intervention in Republican National 
Committee and the subsequent cases in the 2020 election cycle, and explores 
how the Court jeopardized its legitimacy by giving the impression that it 
based these decisions on partisan preferences.128  Section IV.B analyzes the 
Court’s over-reliance on the Purcell principle, which is not a clear-cut rule,129 
and examines how the Court’s application of the principle actually 
contradicted the principle’s purpose.130  Section IV.C argues that the Court 
 
 125. The Court issued its opinion on April 6, 2020, and Wisconsin proceeded with its election 
on April 7, 2020.  See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1206.  As the Court only considered 
the timing of the election and the relief the plaintiffs requested in their preliminary injunction 
motions, it did not assess the merits of the case.  Id. at 1206–07; see also Richard L. Hasen, Reining 
in the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 427, 428–29 (2016) (explaining that the Court’s 
focus on the Purcell Principle can deter it from evaluating “the likelihood of success on the merits 
and relative hardship to the parties,” which it typically considers “in deciding whether to grant or 
vacate a stay or impose an injunction”).  
 126. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1207; see also Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules 
and Constitutional Law, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1836, 1861 (2013) (“The goal of balancing is to 
condemn disproportionate burdens on the exercise of voting rights.”). 
 127. See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The Supreme Court Shouldn’t Decide Voting Cases.  It 
Keeps Getting Them Wrong., WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/supreme-court-election-rulings/2020/10/29/6a7b65d6-
1991-11eb-aeec-b93bcc29a01b_story.html (“[The Court’s] function is to resolve ‘important 
question[s] of federal law.’ . . . By nevertheless granting review, over and over, the [C]ourt has 
become exactly what it professes not to be: a tribunal that fixes the lower courts’ supposed mistakes, 
even when they implicate no larger legal principle.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); 
Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 123, 125 
(2019) (“[T]he ‘shadow docket’ deprives affected parties . . . of the opportunity to fully brief and 
argue the issue; creates at least a possibility of arbitrariness in implementation; and leaves a fog of 
uncertainty as to exactly what the standards are in different categories of cases — a muddle that is 
unhelpful to lower courts as it is to the parties.” (citing William Baude, Death and the Shadow 
Docket, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 12, 2019, 3:30 PM), 
https://reason.com/2019/04/12/death-and-the-shadow-docket/)); see also infra Section IV.A. 
 128. See infra Section IV.A.  
 129. See infra Section IV.B.1. 
 130. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
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has relied on the Purcell principle at the expense of conducting the requisite 
balancing analysis for election-related cases, where courts weigh the burdens 
voters face against the state’s interests in the law.131  Finally, Section IV.D 
critiques Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which properly framed the issue but 
provided insufficient reasoning.132 
A. The Court Jeopardized its Legitimacy by Allowing Partisanship to 
Drive Its Decision-making 
Republican National Committee and its progeny of 2020 general 
election cases suggests that political interests motivated the outcomes at the 
expense of thorough reasoning or deciding cases because of their legal, rather 
than societal, implications.133  The Court did not have to intervene at all—
and should not have done so—because its opinions included sparse 
explanations that disregarded legal precedents.134   
1. The Court Erred in Relying on Its Shadow Docket Instead of Its 
Standard “Merits” Docket  
The Court relied on its shadow docket to decide Republican National 
Committee and the subsequent 2020 general election voting cases.135  
Consequently, these cases are marked by rushed opinions with little basis in 
constitutional doctrine and which threaten the Court’s role and legitimacy.136  
Typically, the Court assesses the merits of a case based on an appeal from a 
lower court’s final decision; this standard docket is called the “merits” 
docket.137  The process takes months and involves written briefing, oral 
 
 131. See infra Section IV.C. 
 132. See infra Section IV.D. 
 133. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 127. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See, e.g., Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9 (2020) (Mem.), granting stay in part to 
Middleton v. Andino, 488 F. Supp. 3d 261 (D.S.C. 2020) (upholding the witness requirement for 
absentee ballots, except for ballots cast before the issuance of the stay and received within two days 
of the order); Dem. Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 28 (2020) (Mem.), denying 
stay to Dem. Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 2020) (rejecting the district court’s 
six-day extension to accept absentee ballots as ordered in Republican National Committee); Scarnati 
v. Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 644 (2020) (Mem.), denying cert. and stay to Pa. Dem. Party v. Boockvar, 
238 A.3d 345 (Pa. 2020) (upholding the district court’s three-day extension for receiving absentee 
ballots as long as they are postmarked by 8:00 PM on election day); Moore v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct. 
46 (2020) (Mem.), denying stay to Wise v. Circosta, 978 F.3d 93 (4th Cir. 2020) (upholding nine-
day extension for receiving absentee ballots after election day); Merrill v. People First of Ala. 
(Mem.), 141 S. Ct. 190 (2020) (Mem.), granting stay to People First of Ala. v. Secretary of State 
for Ala., 467 F. Supp. 3d 1179 (N.D. Ala. 2020) (upholding Alabama’s decision to ban curbside 
voting). 
 136. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 127.  
 137. Id. 
  
2021] REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE 1205 
 
argument, and a signed decision by the Court that provides thorough 
reasoning.138  In contrast, parties in Republican National Committee and in 
the 2020 general election emergency decisions that followed filed emergency 
applications with the Supreme Court even before completion of the lower 
court proceedings.139  After only a few days of briefing and no oral argument, 
the Court issued unsigned opinions without explaining why it approved or 
denied the relief sought.140   
The Court’s approach has effectively altered its role from one that 
decides important questions of federal law to one that corrects lower court 
errors.141  In challenges to election laws, the Court has typically applied the 
Anderson-Burdick balancing test to determine whether state election laws 
unconstitutionally burden the right to vote.142  Although scholars criticize the 
Anderson-Burdick test as “indeterminate” such that its implementation may 
be “arbitrary,”143 it is important to follow this test as a matter of stare 
decisis.144  The Court’s reasoning, which it provides in a formal, written 
opinion that explains its careful evaluation of the parties’ arguments and that 
considers precedent, has an important role in demonstrating to litigants and 
the public that the result is not an arbitrary exercise of political power.145  
Without reasoning, these decisions appear as political exercises of power that 
support states restricting citizens’ abilities to vote.146 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See, e.g., Foley, supra note 126, at 1859; see also infra notes 237–241 and accompanying 
text.   
 144. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (describing the importance of stare 
decisis, which “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal 
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity 
of the judicial process”).  
 145. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 127. 
 146. Id. (“When the court’s rulings are unreasoned . . . they don’t command the same respect.  
They don’t demonstrate to litigants that their concerns have been heard.  And to the public, they 
seem more like exercises of political power than of judicial deliberation.”); Wendy R. Weiser, 
Talking Election Law with the Brennan Center, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/talking-election-law-brennan-center (“If 
the Supreme Court helps decide the presidency or control of the Senate by issuing a ruling that’s 
sharply split on ideological lines, it would dramatically undermine confidence in both the court and 
the election.”). 
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2. Republican and Democratic Parties Have Competing Interests in 
Administering Elections, and the Justices’ Opinions Reflect This 
Divide 
That most of the majority opinions in Republican National Committee 
and the subsequent general election cases did not provide reasoning for 
granting or denying requests for stays suggests that partisanship had an 
important role.147  In election-related challenges, states have a compelling 
interest to enforce state election laws that maintain order, prevent ambiguity, 
and reduce confusion.148  Republicans have thus sought to protect pre-
pandemic voting laws to increase voter confidence in the credibility of the 
elections and to ease the administration of the elections.149  Republican efforts 
have included restricting mail-in voting and early voting, prohibiting sending 
ballot request forms to all registered voters, limiting placement of ballot drop 
boxes, and tightening voter identification requirements.150  In contrast, 
Democrats have aimed to suspend pre-COVID-19 election rules in order to 
respond to the “surge in mail-in ballots due to the pandemic” and USPS 
delays in order to ensure that ballots could arrive in time to be counted.151  
Accordingly, Democrats have supported measures such as extending the 
deadlines for receiving absentee ballots.152 
The Justices’ opinions of election-related cases in the 2020 election 
cycle reflected this partisan divide.  Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch153 
 
 147. See Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court’s Pro-Partisan Turn, 109 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 50, 
50 (2020) (“The United States Supreme Court’s conservative majority has taken the Court’s election 
jurisprudence on a pro-partisanship turn that gives political actors freer range to pass laws and enact 
policies that can help entrench politicians—particularly Republicans—in power and insulate them 
from political competition.”). 
 148. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 971 (W.D. Wis. 2020).  
 149. Lila Hassan & Dan Glaun, COVID-19 and the Most Litigated Presidential Election in 
Recent U.S. History: How the Lawsuits Break Down, PBS FRONTLINE (Oct. 28, 2020) 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/covid-19-most-litigated-presidential-election-in-
recent-us-history/. 
 150. Christina A. Cassidy and Ryan J. Foley, Some Republicans Worry Voting Limits Will Hurt 
the GOP, Too, AP NEWS (May 7, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/tx-state-wire-donald-trump-
election-2020-business-voting-rights-bea2903cf9119ca427327acd2f307364.  
 151. See Jim Rutenberg & Nick Corasaniti, Kavanaugh’s Opinion in Wisconsin Voting Case 
Raises Alarms Among Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 
10/27/us/kavanaugh-voting-rights.html (last updated Nov. 3, 2020).   
 152. See Hassan & Glaun, supra note 149.  
 153. President Donald Trump, a Republican who did not win the popular vote, appointed Justices 
Kavanaugh and Gorsuch, while Republican President George W. Bush, who also did not win a 
plurality of the popular vote, appointed Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts. See Michael J. 
Klarman, The Degradation of American Democracy—And the Court, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1, 243 
(2020).  Republican President George H.W. Bush, who also did not receive the popular vote, 
appointed Justice Thomas to the Court. United States Senate, Supreme Court Nominations (1789-
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consistently voted against the extensions and aligned with Republicans, 
whereas Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor154 consistently voted for the 
extensions and aligned with Democrats.155  However, Justice Kavanaugh and 
Chief Justice Roberts sometimes interpreted Purcell more liberally than the 
other Republican-appointed justices.156  For example, in the Pennsylvania157 
and Wisconsin158 cases regarding the general election, Chief Justice Roberts 
joined the liberal justices on the bench to deny injunctive relief to the 
Republicans and uphold ballot extension deadlines.159  In the South Carolina 
case regarding the general election, Chief Justice Roberts joined the majority 
opinion and Justice Kavanaugh concurred in the decision to permit counting 
completed ballots that lacked a witness signature.160   
3. Republican National Committee Facilitated Partisanship in 
Lower Courts’ Decisions  
The Republican National Committee holding, which was based on a 
“narrow, technical question,” suggested to lower courts that the Purcell 
principle was a hard-and-fast rule that did not require traditional balancing 
analyses of the burdens to voters against the interests of the state.161  As a 
result, subsequent decisions at federal district and appellate levels regarding 
the 2020 general election similarly relied on the Purcell principle and could 
conduct constitutional balancing analyses according to partisan 
 
Present), https://www.senate.gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present. 
htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2020).   
 154. Democratic President Barack Obama appointed Justices Kagan and Sotomayor to the Court. 
See United States Senate, Supreme Court Nominations (1789-Present), 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present.htm (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2020). 
 155. Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court May No Longer Have the Legitimacy to Resolve a 
Disputed Election, ATLANTIC (Feb. 3, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/supreme-court-elections/605899/ (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2021) (“People have begun thinking and talking about ‘Republican justices’ and 
‘Democratic justices,’ and public opinion about the Court now seems to diverge along party lines.”).  
 156. See Josh Gerstein, The Murky Legal Concept That Could Swing the Election, POLITICO 
(Oct. 5, 2020, 7:58 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/05/murky-legal-concept-could-
swing-the-election-426604. 
 157. Scarnati v. Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 724 (2020). 
 158. Moore v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct. 46 (2020); Wise v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct. 658 (2020).   
 159. See Scarnati v. Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 724 (2020); Moore v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct. 46 (2020); 
Wise v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct. 658 (2020). 
 160. Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9, 9–10 (2020). 
 161. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1206 (2020) (per curiam); see also Gerstein, 
supra note 156 (describing the prevalence of the Purcell principle in the 2020 general election 
cases).  
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preferences.162  Just as the Court’s majority has taken a textualist approach 
that is “unsolicitous toward protecting voting rights” when ruling in favor of 
the Republican party,163 lower-court judges appointed by President Trump 
frequently relied on the Purcell principle to favor maintaining restrictions on 
mail-in voting, ballot deadlines, and signature requirements as compared to 
judges nominated by President Obama.164  Trump-appointed judges have 
largely supported the reasoning that state legislatures, not federal courts, 
should set the rules for voting, even during a state of emergency.165  In 
addition to invoking the Purcell principle more frequently to restrict voting 
rights, confusion over how to balance burdens faced by voters and state’s 
interests in administering the elections under Anderson-Burdick has 
permitted conservative judges and justices to weigh concerns of voting fraud 
more heavily.166   
B. The Court’s Reliance on the Purcell Principle Resulted in Severe 
Disenfranchisement and Election Chaos 
In her dissenting opinion in Republican National Committee, Justice 
Ginsburg properly reframed the issue from the majority’s assertion of a 
“narrow, technical question about the absentee ballot process”167 to one about 
whether voters can vote safely during the pandemic.168  But Republican 
National Committee’s “narrow” holding was not narrow in its impact.169  
 
 162. See Ann E. Marimow & Matt Kiefer, Judges Nominated by President Trump Play Key Role 
in Upholding Voting Limits Ahead of Election Day, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2020, 8:00 AM) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/10/31/trump-judges-voting-rights/?arc404=true; 
Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1836, 1838 (2013) 
(explaining that judges “should not rule for Democrats and against Republicans because the judges 
themselves are Democrats or prefer the Democratic Party, and vice versa,” but that exceedingly 
narrow judicial rulings increase this risk). 
 163. See Edward B. Foley, The Supreme Court Ruling on Ballot Deadlines May be More of a 
Reprieve for Democrats Than a Win, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2020, 7:56 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/10/20/supreme-court-ruling-ballot-deadlines-
may-be-more-reprieve-democrats-than-win/.  
 164. See Marimow & Kiefer, supra note 162. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id.; see also infra Section IV.C; Hassan & Glaun, supra note 149 (describing an increase 
among conservatives’ “spurious and unsubstantiated allegations of fraud” in litigation “against the 
expansion of mail-in voting”).  However, studies show that absentee-voter fraud is rare.  Brent 
Kendall & Alexa Corse, Coronavirus Intensifies Legal Tussle over Voting Rights; Pandemic Adds 
Twist to Some Long-Simmering Controversies Playing Out During 2020 Election Cycle, WALL ST. 
J. (Apr. 19, 2020, 2:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-intensifies-legal-tussle-
over-voting-rights-11587315601.  
 167. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1206 (2020) (per curiam). 
 168. Id. at 1211 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 169. Contra Foley, supra note 126, at 1837–38 (explaining that narrow judicial rulings make it 
harder for people to “determine whether a future court is being unprincipled in refusing to apply the 
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Rather, it served as a prelude to the voting cases leading up to the November 
2020 general election, which have deterred minor changes to the election 
process that would mitigate disenfranchisement resulting from COVID-19.170  
While the pandemic forced polling locations to close and created serious 
public health risks for those voting in person, it also posed significant 
obstacles to those voting absentee.171  The surge in absentee ballot requests 
overwhelmed state election commissions and the resulting backlogs in 
processing these requests, coupled with pandemic-caused mail delays, 
exacerbated the likelihood that voters would not receive and be able to return 
their ballots in time to be counted.172   
The 2020 General Election involved “a record-breaking amount of 
litigation”173 and “[a] record number of votes” cast absentee174 that reflected 
a strong partisan divide regarding absentee ballots.175  While more Democrats 
wanted to vote by mail for the 2020 election, more Republicans wanted to 
vote in person, in accordance with the Republican Party’s reassurance that 
voters could do so safely.176  The Court did not provide explanations for many 
 
precedent in new circumstances” because they “do[] not tell future judges enough about what is 
factually important in the precedent case to assess whether future cases are relevantly similar or 
dissimilar”). 
 170. See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Failing to Respect the Passive Virtues: A Critique of RNC v. 
DNC, ELECTION L. BLOG (Apr. 27, 2020, 6:59 AM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=110999#_ftn2 
(“My deepest concern about the opinion that was issued is that it has very likely foreclosed modest 
adjustments in election adjustments when future courts are faced with elections where 
circumstances like the pandemic are impacting the ability to vote.”).  
 171. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 961 (W.D. Wis. 2020); see 
also infra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 172. See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 957–58, 961.  
 173. Hassan & Glaun, supra note 149; see also Stanford-MIT, COVID-Related Election 
Litigation Tracker, HEALTHY ELECTIONS PROJECT, https://healthyelections-case-
tracker.stanford.edu/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) (showing that prior to the election more than 400 
lawsuits had been filed in 44 states, and following the election, that number surpassed 500 in 46 
states plus Washington, D.C.). 
 174. See Drew Desilver, Most Mail and Provisional Ballots Got Counted in Past U.S. Elections 
– But Many Did Not, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2020/11/10/most-mail-and-provisional-ballots-got-counted-in-past-u-s-elections-but-many-
did-not/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2021) (estimating 65 million voters cast absentee ballots).  
 175. Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Will SCOTUS Rulings Help Decide the 2020 
Presidential Election?, ABA J. (Sept. 2, 2020, 10:18 AM CDT), https://www.abajournal.com/ 
news/article/chemerinsky-will-supreme-court-rulings-help-decide-the-2020-election. (“This is an 
election where Republicans, led by President Donald Trump, are seeking to limit absentee ballots, 
and Democrats expand them.  It is one where Democrats are likely to bring lawsuits to enlarge the 
ability of people to vote and Republicans are likely to oppose them.”).  
 176. Russell Berman, If You Can Grocery Shop in Person, You Can Vote in Person, THE 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/09/voting-during-
pandemic-pretty-safe/616084/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2021); see also Brent Kendall & Alexa Corse, 
supra note 166 (explaining that Democrats support vote-by-mail expansion, and while some 
Republican-led states are also advancing vote-by-mail options, “[President] Trump and the RNC 
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of its emergency decisions, but the parties’ briefs, lower courts’ analyses, and 
Justices’ concurrences and dissents suggest that the Court’s application of 
Purcell in Republican National Committee was a deciding factor in many of 
its decisions.177  Rather than preventing confusion and disenfranchisement, 
however, reliance on the Purcell principle in this context generated further 
restrictions so that fewer votes counted.178 
1. The Court Gave Too Much Weight to an Ambiguous Principle 
In Republican National Committee, the Court primarily relied on the 
Purcell principle,179  which is a “shadow doctrine” that lacks a clearly defined 
analytical framework and frequently arises in the Supreme Court’s “shadow 
docket.”180  The Purcell principle suggests that courts should not issue orders 
affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, close to an election because 
as the election approaches, the likelihood that those orders cause voter 
confusion and disenfranchisement increases.181  These “considerations 
specific to election cases and [their] own institutional procedures”182 attempt 
to prevent electoral chaos among voters and election officials that result from 
changing or conflicting orders close to the election.183   
Yet, the Court has not clearly defined the contours of the Purcell 
principle, including what the cutoff time of an election is or how flexibly the 
 
oppose nationwide mail-in voting” because “not all states could have the logistics in place by 
November and . . . it could open the door to ballot tampering and other fraud”); Pew Research 
Center, 4. Voter Engagement and Interest, Voting By Mail and In Person, In: Amid Campaign 
Turmoil, Biden Holds Wide Leads on Coronavirus, Unifying the Country (Oct. 9, 2020), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/10/09/voter-engagement-and-interest-voting-by-mail-
and-in-person/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2021) (reporting findings from an August poll conducted before 
states began general election voting, where 60% of Trump supporters preferred to vote in person on 
Election Day and 17% preferred to vote by mail, but 23% of Biden supporters preferred to vote in 
person on Election Day and 58% preferred to vote by mail).  
 177. See Gerstein, supra note 156; Connor Clerkin et al., Mail Voting Litigation During the 
Coronavirus Pandemic, Stanford-MIT Healthy Elections Project (Oct. 26, 2020), 
https://healthyelections.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/Mail_Voting_Litigation_0.pdf (anticipating 
that courts would increasingly consider the Purcell principle as the election approached).   
 178. See Hassan & Glaun, supra note 149. 
 179. See supra Part II.  
 180. Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Freeing Purcell from the Shadows, TAKE CARE BLOG (Sept. 27, 
2020), https://takecareblog.com/blog/freeing-purcell-from-the-shadows (describing “shadow 
doctrines” as “rules the Court applies only in its non-merits cases” and the Court’s “shadow docket” 
as “disputes . . . resolve[d] summarily, without the usual briefing, argument, explanations, or even 
indications how each Justice voted”); see also William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s 
Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY, 5 (2015) (describing the Court’s “shadow docket” as its 
“non-merits work”); supra text accompanying notes 135–140.  
 181. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam). 
 182. Id. at 4.  
 183. Hasen, supra 125, at 441. 
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principle can be interpreted.184  This uncertainty traces back to the Purcell 
opinion, where the Court held that the Ninth Circuit failed to consider 
election-specific considerations and potential harms resulting from issuing or 
not issuing an injunction, while not providing the necessary deference to the 
district court’s findings.185  The uncertainty arises from the Court’s failure to 
specify which factor drove its decision to vacate the Ninth Circuit’s 
injunction of Arizona voter identification procedures: the failure of the Ninth 
Circuit to give reasons for its order; the Ninth Circuit’s failure to make 
“considerations specific to election cases and its own institutional 
procedures;” or the close timing of the election and the possibility of en banc 
review.186 
Importantly, the Purcell principle is only one factor of many that courts 
consider when issuing emergency stays.187  Courts also consider the 
likelihood of success on the merits, the potential for irreparable injury to both 
parties, and the public interest.188  However, these considerations “cannot be 
controlling.”189  Courts must give some level of deference to the lower court’s 
decision.190  Additionally, courts typically apply the Anderson-Burdick 
balancing test’s lower level of scrutiny to challenges of infringement on 
voting rights to assess the likelihood of success on the merits.191  In Purcell, 
the Court did not apply this balancing analysis—it did not evaluate the harms 
to the parties beyond considering the public’s interest in not changing the 
rules close to an election.192   
In Republican National Committee, the Court narrowly applied the 
Purcell principle to stand for the notion that lower federal courts should not 
change “the election rules on the eve of an election,” so as to avoid the 
“judicially created confusion” that might result from ballots being mailed and 
postmarked after election day.193  The district court subsequently enjoined 
the public release of any election results until six days after election day, but 
 
 184. Gerstein, supra note 156. 
 185. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4–5.  
 186. Hasen, supra 125, at 440 (quoting Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4.). 
 187. Id. at 428.  
 188. Id. at 441, 444; see also Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009) (internal citations 
omitted) (establishing the standards for granting or vacating a stay as likelihood of success on the 
merits, irreparable harm to the movant, harm to other parties, and the public interest).  Professor 
Richard L. Hasen advocates for the Purcell principle to fall into the public interest prong but argues 
that these concerns should not be the sole consideration.  Hasen, supra note 125, at 441. 
 189. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (per curiam). 
 190. Id. 
 191. See supra 122 and accompanying text. 
 192. Hasen, supra note 125, at 443. 
 193. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1206–1207 (2020) (per curiam). 
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the Court doubted that order’s effectiveness.194  The Court surmised that, 
despite the order, information would be released that would affect the 
integrity of the election process,195 likely by informing voters of which 
candidate led in the precinct and thereby motivating the behavior of voters 
who had not yet cast their ballots.  
The Court’s analysis gave too much weight to the Purcell principle 
without accounting for considerations specific to granting stays and other 
election-specific concerns.196  Like the appellate court in Purcell, the Court 
in Republican National Committee failed to consider the likelihood of 
success on the merits, the relative irreparable harm to the parties, and the 
public interest factors.197  By not considering these factors, the Court also 
erred by not providing deference to the lower court’s factual findings of 
irreparable harm, inadequate remedies at law, and the likelihood of success 
on the merits.198  In particular, the Court disregarded the district court’s 
application of the Anderson-Burdick balancing test and conclusion “that the 
existing deadlines for absentee voting would unconstitutionally burden 
Wisconsin citizens’ right to vote.”199   
By not providing deference to the district court’s factual findings and 
by failing to adequately show why these findings were incorrect, the Court 
did not follow the holding in Purcell.200  A significant issue involved the 
Court’s failure to consider COVID-19;201 instead, it treated this case as it 
would “an ordinary election.”202  The Court did not acknowledge the district 
court’s findings of fact regarding the current state of the COVID-19 health 
crisis, the increased reliance on absentee ballots, and the dangers of voting in 
person.203  For example, the Court did not consider the district court’s 
findings that the number of absentee ballots requested dwarfed those in the 
previous four spring elections by tenfold; the state election board could not 
process the surge in requests, resulting in severe backlogs; voters could not 
easily vote in person; the public health risk of voting in person, especially for 
senior poll workers; or most importantly, the estimated 27,500 absentee 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam); Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. 
Ct. at 1206–1208. 
 197. See supra text accompanying note 192; Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1206–1208. 
 198. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1206–1208. 
 199. Id. at 1209 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 200. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. at 4–5.  
 201. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1210 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s 
suggestion that the current situation is not ‘substantially different’ from ‘an ordinary election’ 
boggles the mind.”). 
 202. See id. at 1207. 
 203. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 960 (W.D. Wis. 2020). 
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ballots projected to be received after 8:00 P.M. on the day of the election that 
would not be counted.204  
The Court’s minimal analysis and its reliance on the Purcell principle 
as its primary justification—which itself is neither a “hard-and-fast rule” nor 
“well developed”205—demonstrates the decision’s improper application of 
the doctrines historically applied to voting challenges.  Additionally, the 
vagueness of the Purcell principle has resulted in its unpredictable 
application that threatens a partisan result.206   
2. The Court’s Application of the Purcell Principle Contradicted the 
Principle’s Purpose by Causing Further Election Chaos and 
Disenfranchisement  
The Court relied on the Purcell principle to argue that the lower federal 
courts cannot change election rules immediately before the election because 
doing so will result in judicially created confusion.207  The Court, however, 
misapplied the Purcell principle by only discussing a portion of the principle 
and not weighing other critical election-specific considerations.208  This 
resulted an outcome that contravened the principle’s purpose.  The principle 
provides that as an election draws closer, the risk will increase that a court’s 
orders will “result in voter confusion” and, consequently, push voters “away 
from the polls.”209  Additionally, “electoral chaos” may result from 
“conflicting court orders” telling election officials “how to run an 
election.”210 
The application of Purcell depends on the kind of policy being 
challenged.211  Policies establishing the basic building blocks of the election, 
such as at-large voting, should almost never be changed close to an 
election.212  However, policies incapable of causing voter confusion because 
they apply only to administrators, such as implementing a signature match 
 
 204. Id. at 961–62.  
 205. Gerstein, supra note 156. 
 206. Id.; see also supra Section IV.A.2 (discussing partisan trends in the Court’s election-related 
decisions). 
 207. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1207.  
 208. Id. 
 209. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam); see also Hasen, supra note 125, 
at 441 (“When the rules for elections change, voters may not only be confused; they can be 
disenfranchised (for example, by not having the right documentation or showing up at the wrong 
polling place).”).  
 210. Hasen, supra note 125, at 441.  
 211. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 180 (“[C]ourts shouldn’t assume that this probability is 
high; they should assess it based on the best available evidence.”). 
 212. Id. 
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requirement, do not invoke the Purcell principle.213  Extending the deadline 
for absentee voting during the pandemic falls in between the two ends of the 
spectrum, and, therefore, the Court should have considered the remedy’s 
impacts on voter confusion and disenfranchisement.214   
Although a direct application of the Purcell principle requires a 
reviewing court to stay a lower court’s order issued in the days leading up to 
the election, the Court in Republican National Committee misapplied the 
principle by overlooking important election-specific concerns.215  First, by 
looking only at the public’s interest in not changing the election rules close 
to an election, the Court omitted Purcell’s concern for disenfranchisement 
and did not account for the inevitable confusion that would result in the midst 
of a global pandemic.216  The Court ignored the “certainty that thousands of 
ballots [would] arrive after the April 7, 2020 deadline.”217  Consequently, 
tens of thousands of absentee voters, who timely requested their absentee 
ballots, did not receive their ballots in time for their votes to be counted.218  
Voters who did not receive their ballots in time were forced to choose 
between sacrificing their fundamental political right to vote219 and risking 
their health and safety to vote in person.220  And in the City of Madison, 
 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See Hasen, supra note 125, at 441–42. 
 216. Id.; see also Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam). 
 217. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 975 (W.D. Wis. 2020). 
 218. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1210 (2020) (per curiam) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  However, during the “extended period, nearly 80,000 additional votes arrived and were 
counted, according to the Wisconsin Elections Commission.” Brent Kendall and Jess Bravin, 
Supreme Court Rejects Pandemic-Spurred Voting Changes in Wisconsin, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 
2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-denies-extended-mail-ballot-deadline-in-
wisconsin-11603758108.  See also The New York Times, Wisconsin Primary Recap: Voters Forced 
to Choose Between Their Health and Their Civic Duty, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/us/politics/wisconsin-primary-election.html (reporting on 
election day that “[o]fficial state figures showed that of 1,282,762 ballots requested, 1,273,374 had 
been sent, a shortfall of about 9,000”).  
 219. Contra Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 2 (2006) (voters could cast provisional ballots); 
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 186 (2008) (same).  
 220. To Members of the United States Senate and House of Representatives (May 5, 2020),  
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2020/05/05061221/21DemocracyTeam_finalma
ilvotingandcovid19.pdf?_ga=2.104965632.2029394591.1603550377-683790534.1603550377; see 
also Nick Corasaniti & Reid J. Epstein, At Least 7 in Wisconsin Got Coronavirus During Voting, 
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/21/us/politics/wisconsin-election-coronavirus-cases.html 
(documenting that at least seven people contracted COVID-19 from voting in-person based on only 
30% of the data); CDC Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), Polling Locations and Voters, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/election-polling-locations.html (last 
updated Jan. 4, 2021) (warning against in-person voting because of crowds and longer wait times); 
see also The New York Times, Wisconsin Primary Recap: Voters Forced to Choose Between Their 
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“[h]undreds of absentee ballots” that voters mailed back—likely before 
election day—did not have a postmark and risked invalidation.221   
The Court also failed to consider that its stay created further confusion.  
Election officials had already spent the previous few days establishing 
procedures and informing voters in accordance with the district court’s 
deadline.222  Requiring election officials to change instructions even closer to 
the deadline only increases the state’s burdens, as states then have to supply 
additional resources to train poll worker volunteers on new rules and 
procedures and develop new written instructions just before the election.223   
These changes could also make voters more confused, as they relied on 
other guidance (i.e., the guidance prepared in accordance with the district 
court’s order) issued only days before.224  Although, even if the district 
court’s extension of the deadline for receiving absentee ballots caused 
confusion, that confusion did not leave voters in a worse position than 
before—rather, a better one.  Sending in a ballot according to the statutory 
deadline, which was earlier than the district court’s change required, still 
meant that those ballots counted.225  But the confusion caused by the Court’s 
postmarked-by requirement left voters in a worse position because voters had 
to act immediately for their votes to count, and voters who timely requested 
their absentee ballots could not vote if they had not yet received their 
ballots.226  
Additionally, the Court did not acknowledge the district court’s finding 
that the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits, which it 
determined by primarily relying on the evidence indicating inevitable 
 
Health and Their Civic Duty, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/us/politics/wisconsin-primary-election.html (explaining that 
in Milwaukee, where the predominately black northern part of the city experienced the highest rates 
of COVID-19, voters—overwhelmingly black and Hispanic—who had not cast absentee ballots 
waited in line for hours to vote in person).  
 221. Laura Schulte and Patrick Marley, Many Wisconsin Absentee Ballots Returned Without 
Postmarks and May Not Be Counted Because of It, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, 
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/2020/04/10/wisconsin-election-votes-may-not-count-
ballots-without-postmark/5123238002/ (Apr. 12, 2020, 9:29 AM CT). 
 222. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1210 (2020) (per curiam) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 223. See Hasen, supra note 125, at 441.   
 224. See e.g., Linda Schmidt, Confused About Voting? Your Options for Election Day 2020, 
FOX5 N.Y. (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.fox5ny.com/news/confused-about-voting-your-options-
for-election-day-2020; Reid J. Epstein, Confused About Voting? Here are Some Easy Tips, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/voting-tips.html. 
 225. See infra note 258 and accompanying text. 
 226. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1209 (2020) (per curiam) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
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disenfranchisement.227  The district court extended the absentee ballot 
deadline after careful analysis of the respective harms with the aim to 
minimize the 2020 election chaos—particularly voters’ confusion about how 
to vote—that resulted from the rapidly evolving COVID-19 pandemic.228  
Even if the likelihood of success demonstrated greater certainty, invoking a 
“complex balancing” analysis that accurately accounts for the severity of 
voter confusion and disenfranchisement should have led the Court to deny 
the stay.229  By narrowly considering that lower courts’ changes to election 
rules close to the election result in confusion, the Court’s decision to change 
the election rules even closer to the election did not prevent judicially-related 
confusion and disenfranchisement; it facilitated confusion and 
disenfranchisement.230   
The Court’s reliance on the Republican National Committee framework, 
which itself narrowly applied the Purcell principle at the expense of weighing 
election-related considerations along with the harms of issuing or not issuing 
an injunction, has prevented flexibility in a time of crisis.231  As a 
consequence, the Court has implicitly undermined the long-established 
fundamental political right to vote.232  This result calls into question the 
applicability of the Purcell principle, particularly during times of crisis, 
where it has been used as an excuse to restrict voting rights.233   
C. The Court’s Emphasis on the Purcell Principle Masked Its Failure 
to Apply the Requisite Balancing Test for Deciding Election Cases 
Election law’s federalist approach requires some system of regulation.  
Accordingly, the Anderson-Burdick “flexible balancing test” provides a 
 
 227. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 976 (W.D. Wis. 2020). 
 228. See supra notes 203–204 and accompanying text.  
 229. See Hasen, supra note 125, at 443.   
 230. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1210 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 231. See supra Section IV.A.3. 
 232. Wendy Weiser & Daniel Weiner, The Supreme Court’s “Breathtakingly Radical” New 
Approach to Election Law, POLITICO MAG.  (Nov. 22, 2020, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/11/22/supreme-court-election-law-voting-rights-
438844 (explaining that the Court’s decisions ultimately limited voting access responses to the 
pandemic that the federal courts had generally permitted and disenfranchised tens of thousands of 
Americans, particularly people of color).  
 233. See Rick Hasen, The Biggest Problem with the Supreme Court’s Opinion in the Wisconsin 
Voting Case Was Not the Result (Which Was Still Wrong), But the Court’s Sloppiness and 
Nonchalance About Voting Rights and What That Means for November, ELECTION L. BLOG (Apr. 
10, 2020, 12:39 PM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=110647 (advocating for courts to abandon the 
Purcell principle when an emergency outside the parties’ control causes a court to issue an 
emergency election order); Hassan & Glaun, supra note 149 (explaining that abiding by the Purcell 
principle can prevent necessary changes to voting laws that prevent voters from having their votes 
counted).  
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mechanism for the Court to employ to determine whether “a state’s rules and 
procedures . . . violate the Fourteenth Amendment.”234 
Yet, in Republican National Committee, the Court rigidly applied the 
Purcell principle, without mentioning the Anderson-Burdick balancing test, 
to avoid making much-needed changes to old election rules that would 
consider voters’ health and safety during a global pandemic.235  While it is 
possible that the Court conducted an implicit balancing analysis,236 the 
majority’s failure to acknowledge Anderson or Burdick likely suggests that 
the Court is continuing to grapple with its implementation, rather than 
outright rejecting it.237  The Court has not yet articulated a uniform approach 
for weighing burdens on the right to vote with the state’s interests.238  Despite 
the Court’s failure to provide clear guidance on how to apply Anderson-
Burdick, lower courts continue to rely on it.239  As with the ambiguous 
Purcell principle, this lack of guidance can provide judges with too much 
 
 234. See Edward B. Foley, supra note 126, at 1847.  
 235. See supra text accompanying note 193. 
 236. See Foley, supra note 126, at 1852 (suggesting that Bush v. Gore had “an implicit element 
of balancing”). 
 237. Id. at 1847.  The Court has not yet agreed on the method for balancing the burdens under 
the Anderson-Burdick balancing test.  See Brief of Erwin Chemerinsky as amicus curiae in support 
of neither party [Applicable Legal Standard], at 12, Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 
U.S. 181, 190 (2008), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-
work/e91c0b5e230c0db479_2jm6b17yw.pdf (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337, 305 
(1972)) (arguing that in Crawford, the Court should clarify confusion faced in the lower courts about 
which level of constitutional scrutiny to apply by reaffirming the validity of the Dunn line of cases, 
which apply strict scrutiny to lawsuits alleging the complete denial of the right to vote); Foley, supra 
note 126, at 1853–54 (arguing that the Court’s “imprecise . . . reasoning” in Bush v. Gore, Anderson, 
Burdick, and Crawford makes them impossible to square with each other and creates confusion and 
uncertainty for lower courts in their voting law jurisprudence).   
 238. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. at 200; id. at 204–05 (Scalia, J., 
concurring); id. at 218 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 237 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  While the plurality 
in Crawford considered the burdens on a “voter-specific basis,” the Scalia concurrence rejected this 
approach and engaged in “wholesale balancing: weighing the law’s burden on all voters collectively, 
as compared to the state’s across-the-board interests in adopting the law.”  Foley, supra note 126, 
at 1848–49 (emphasis added). 
 239. Foley, supra note 126, at 1854, 1859; see also Joshua A. Douglas, A Tale of Two Election 
Law Standards, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/a-tale-
of-two-election-law-standards/ (surmising that “Anderson-Burdick balancing is itself flawed, and 
the courts must recognize the centrality of the right to vote to our democratic system and impose 
stringent rules on governments that try to infringe on that right”); Derek T. Muller, The Fundamental 
Weakness of Flabby Balancing Tests in Federal Election Law Litigation, EXCESS OF DEMOCRACY 
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2020/4/the-fundamental-weakness-of-
flabby-balancing-tests-in-federal-election-law-litigation (explaining that the Anderson-Burdick 
balancing test “is unusually weak as a vehicle for protecting ‘voting rights’ under the Constitution”).  
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discretion to decide cases according to their own political beliefs,240 which 
can be problematic in policy-related cases.241 
Meanwhile, too flexible of an application of Purcell—one that 
disregards the importance of timing altogether and relies solely on the also 
indeterminate Anderson-Burdick inquiry—would allow Courts to more 
easily change election rules just before an election.  In addition to creating 
confusion among voters, changing election rules can also cause confusion 
among election officials, which may lead to mistakes in administering the 
elections.242   
The Court has not yet clarified the contours of either the Purcell 
principle243 or the Anderson-Burdick balancing test244 and did not apply them 
in conjunction with each other in Republican National Committee.245  Thus, 
it was insufficient for the Court to rely on the Purcell principle alone as a 
“hard-edged rule.”246  Purcell itself emphasizes the importance of deference 
to a lower court’s findings of fact, consideration of the harms to the parties, 
and evaluation of factors specific to election cases.247  Accordingly, the Court 
should rely on it as a standard that, in addition to considering the factors that 
Purcell articulates—the proximity of the election and the likelihood of new 
rules creating confusion and disenfranchisement—also considers other 
election-specific concerns, such as the probability of election officials 
making errors when administering the elections and the timing of the 
 
 240. Muller, supra note 239 (citing Daunt v. Benson, 956 F.3d 396, 423 (6th Cir. 2020) (Readler, 
J., concurring in the judgment)) (“The temptation to overindulge in the Anderson-Burdick test has 
not gone unnoticed.”).  The Anderson-Burdick test “allow[s] a judge ‘easily [to] tinker[ ] with levels 
of scrutiny to achieve [his or her] desired result.’”  Daunt v. Benson, 956 F.3d 396, 423 (6th Cir. 
2020) (Readler, J., concurring in the judgment) (second, third, and fourth alternations in original) 
(quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2327 (2016) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting)); see also Foley, supra note 126, at 1859 (expressing concern that judges can abuse the 
Anderson-Burdick balancing’s vague standard to decide cases to achieve their own desired result, 
without considering the law, and that this may become binding “if a majority of the Supreme Court 
chooses to be willfully disobedient to the Court’s own precedent”).  
 241. Muller, supra note 239 (citing Daunt, 956 F.3d at 424 (Readler, J., concurring in the 
judgment)) (“In sensitive policy-oriented cases, it affords far too much discretion to judges in 
resolving the dispute before them.”). 
 242. Stephanopoulos, supra note 180 (“Court orders can disrupt administrators’ familiar 
routines, compel them to make determinations for which they lack training or experience, and 
extend how long each step in the process takes.  As a result, the vote count can be slowed or even 
rendered inaccurate thanks to election officials’ missteps under the new court-imposed rules.”); see 
also supra notes 222–223 and accompanying text. 
 243. Id. (“[T]he Purcell principle remains remarkably opaque.”). 
 244. See supra notes 237 and 238 and accompanying text. 
 245. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020) (per curiam).  
 246. Stephanopoulos, supra note 180. 
 247. See supra text accompanying notes 93 and 95. 
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litigation compared to when the law was enacted.248  As the Purcell principle 
invokes a multi-factor test, the Court would help future applications of the 
test by clearly articulating how it weighed each of the relevant factors in its 
decisions.   
D. Though It Accurately Defined the Issue, the Dissent Also Did Not 
Properly Apply the Requisite Constitutional Analyses  
In her dissenting opinion in Republican National Committee, Justice 
Ginsburg properly articulated the issue as assessing the burden on voters but 
offered limited support.249  Her dissent cited the district court’s Anderson-
Burdick balancing analysis, which concluded that the pre-COVID-19 
statutory deadlines for receiving absentee votes “would unconstitutionally 
burden Wisconsin citizens’ right to vote.”250  However, she never mentioned 
the importance of employing that balancing test, she did not apply the test 
herself, and finally, she did not discuss the Court’s failure to cite to Anderson 
or Burdick.251  Similarly, she referenced the Court’s reliance on the Purcell 
principle, but did not properly apply it.252  
Justice Kagan’s analysis in Democratic National Committee v. 
Wisconsin State Legislature253 highlights the aspects of Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent that could have been more robust.254  In that case, Justice Kagan 
averred that the Court’s decision would disenfranchise large numbers of 
voters who timely requested and mailed their ballots but whose ballots did 
not arrive in time to be counted due to mail delays.255  There, Justice Kagan 
applied the Anderson-Burdick balancing test to determine whether the 
disenfranchisement resulting from backlogs and mail delays imposed a 
severe burden on the right to vote.256  She criticized the appellate court’s 
“fixati[on] on timing alone” and explained why it had misapplied the Purcell 
 
 248. Stephanopoulos, supra note 180.   
 249. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1211 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 250. Id. at 1209.  
 251. Id. 
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principle.257  She reasoned extending the absentee ballot-receipt deadline 
would not confuse voters because the worst outcome would be that voters 
mail their ballots a few days early.258  Moreover, counting votes does not 
“undermine the ‘integrity’ of [the democratic] process,” whereas discarding 
“timely cast ballots that, because of pandemic conditions, arrive a bit after 
Election Day,” does.259 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent did not highlight the Court’s complete 
disregard of the Anderson-Burdick balancing test.260  Though the test is 
imperfect,261 it is important for the Court to apply longstanding procedures 
for determining the constitutionality of state election laws.262  Additionally, 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent suggested that the Court improperly relied on the 
Purcell principle, but did not explain how it misapplied it, beyond its 
hypocrisy of changing the election laws closer to the election than the district 
court, and its failure to consider that the district court was responding to a 
“rapidly developing public health crisis.”263  A more substantive analysis 
would have shed more light on how the Court erred and could have 
influenced subsequent decisions in cases leading up to the election.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In Republican National Committee, the United States Supreme Court 
effectively modified the district court’s six-day extension for receiving 
absentee ballots by requiring that absentee voters postmark their ballots by 
Election Day.264  Ultimately, the Court’s reliance on and interpretation of the 
Purcell principle, along with its failure to explicitly assess the burdens on 
voters during the pandemic, jeopardized the ability of tens of thousands of 
voters who timely requested ballots to exercise their right to vote.265  The 
Court’s inadequate analysis in Republican National Committee laid the 
foundation for the Court’s subsequent emergency decisions as the 2020 
general election approached and created the impression that its decisions 
were made according to partisan preferences.266  It also raises important 
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concerns for the future of the Court’s role in voting cases267 and its continued 
reliance on the Purcell principle in emergency situations as an inflexible 
rule.268  In failing to engage in a constitutional balancing analysis, the Court 
signaled that courts could rely on the Purcell principle in lieu of following 
the Anderson-Burdick precedent.269  Finally, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent did 
not go far enough in exposing the Court’s insufficient reasoning, which was 
marked by its avoidance in following established constitutional 
procedures.270  Importantly, the Court’s decisions in Republican National 
Committee and its progeny, all marked by little to no reasoning, leave open 
critical questions about the Court’s legitimacy and its future prioritization of 
the fundamental political right to vote.271 
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